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PRECAP: MMIA v. Bozeman; Insurance, Reinsurance, and the
Boundaries of McCarran-Ferguson Reverse Pre-emption
E. Lars Phillips
I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Does the Federal Arbitration Act preempt Mont. Code Ann. § 275-114(2)(c), which invalidates arbitration agreements in insurance policies
except those found in contracts between insurance companies, in spite of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s reverse preemption provision, which
delegates the regulation of the business of insurance to the states?
II. INTRODUCTION
This case stems from alleged damages resulting from the “actual
and threatened escape of pollutants from the Story Mill Road landfill” in
Bozeman.1
The City of Bozeman presented claims for defense and potential
indemnity to Montana Municipal Interlocal Authority (MMIA), a
“taxpayer-funded governmental entity created by its member Montana
cities and towns” providing pooled risk protection pursuant to Memoranda
of Coverage agreements.2 On December 15, 2014, following a coverage
dispute involving the “absolute pollution exclusion,” MMIA filed a
declaratory judgment action to determine its duty to indemnify or defend
the City of Bozeman.3 Wecso Insurance Company (“Wesco”), from whom
MMIA had purchased reinsurance to cover damages in excess of $3.5
million, was subsequently notified of the potential claims, and responded
that the claims at issue were not covered by the Certificate of Facultative
Reinsurance (“the Certificate”) it had issued to MMIA.4
III. BACKGROUND
The Certificate issued by Wesco contained a provision requiring
arbitration: “Any dispute between the Company [MMIA] and the
Reinsurer [Wesco] arising out of the provision of this Agreement, or
concerning its interpretation or validity shall be submitted to
arbitration[.]”5 On December 22, 2014, shortly after MMIA had filed its
declaratory judgment action, Wesco demanded arbitration regarding
MMIA’s decision to defend the City of Bozeman pending the district
Appellant’s Brief, MMIA v. Bozeman, at *3 (Oct. 1, 2105) (No. DA 15-0399).
Id. at *2–3.
3
Id. at *3–4.
4
Id. at *4–5.
5
Id. at *5.
1
2
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court’s determination of coverage.6 MMIA notified Wesco of its objection
to arbitration on January 9, 2015.7 However, after Wesco notified MMIA
that it was moving forward with arbitration proceedings, the arbitration
panel convened on February 26, 2015.8 Subsequently, MMIA filed a
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Petition for Preliminary
Injunction attempting to enjoin arbitration.9 On May 15, 2015, the District
Court dissolved the Temporary Restraining Order and denied MMIA’s
request for an injunction.10
IV. ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL
While both sides use their briefs to fling various arguments across
the aisle (MMIA’s argues it had no notice of the arbitration provision; 11
Wesco argues it “never got its day in [federal] court”),12 the thrust of the
case will likely come down to Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-114(2)(c) and
whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s reverse preemption provision
applies.
A. Appellant Montana Municipal Interlocal Authority
MMIA argues that the arbitration provision in the Certificate is
unenforceable as Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-114(2)(c) invalidates arbitration
provisions in “any agreement concerning or relating to insurance
policies.”13 MMIA contends the Federal Arbitration Act’s general
preemption of state arbitration laws is “reverse preempted” by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act’s guarantee that “[n]o Act of Congress shall be
construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.”14 MMIA argues
that § 27-5-114(2)(c) falls within the ambit of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act’s broad reverse preemption trigger as it directly regulates the business
of insurance.
B. Amicus Curiae Montana State Auditor in Support of Appellant
The Montana State Auditor waded into the fray to contest a
particular aspect of the District Court’s order, whether the Montana

6

Id. at *5–6.
Appellant’s Brief, MMIA v. Bozeman, at *6 (Oct. 1, 2105) (No. DA 15-0399).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Appellee’s Answering Brief and Brief in Support of Cross-Appeal, MMIA v. Bozeman, at *3 (Dec.
12, 2015) (No. DA 15-0399).
11
Appellant’s Br., at *5.
12
Appellee’s Br., at *8.
13
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–5–114(2)(c) (2015).
14
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012).
7
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Insurance Code is the sole method of regulating insurance in Montana, as
well as the general question of whether Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-114(2)(c)
is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.15
First, the State Auditor argues that, as the Code provides a
directive to “enforce laws related to the business of insurance,” the
Auditor’s authority is not limited to the Code itself but to all regulations
related to the business of insurance within the Montana Code in general.
In support of this proposition, the State Auditor cites numerous provisions
that exist outside of the code, but fall within the Code’s directive to
regulate the business of insurance.16
Second, the State Auditor argues that Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5114(2)(c) is not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act because of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act’s guarantee that the States act as the primary
regulators of insurance. The State Auditor cites decisions from other State
Supreme Courts, interpreting language almost identical to that at issue in
§ 27-5-114(2)(c), determining that the statutes were “crafted with the
purpose to regulate insurance.”17
C. Appellee Wesco Insurance Company
Wesco argues that the District Court was correct in determining
that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts § 27-5-114(2)(c) for a litany of
reasons. First, Wesco argues the statute does not apply to the Certificate at
issue because it is not an insurance policy, but rather a reinsurance
contract. In support of this contention, Wesco notes that the public policy
behind the statute is aimed at protecting unsophisticated insurance
policyholders from being forced into arbitration with their insurers. Wesco
contends that MMIA is a sophisticated de facto insurer and therefore
outside the scope of the class the statute was intended to protect.
Second, Wesco argues that because § 27-5-114(2)(c) does not
apply to reinsurance the regulation of reinsurance arbitration agreements
is an area of law specifically reserved to the Federal Arbitration Act.18
Third, Wesco contends that the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s reverse
preemption doesn’t apply because § 27-5-114(2)(c) does not regulate the
business of insurance. To support this contention, Wesco argues that the
regulation of insurance in Montana is confined to the Montana Insurance
Code.19
Finally, Wesco argues that even if the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s
reverse prevention did apply, the Certificate is a contract between two

15

Amicus Curie Brief of the Montana State Auditor, MMIA v. Bozeman, at *2 (Oct. 1, 2015) (No. DA
15-0399).
16
Id. at *3–4.
17
Id. at *10.
18
Appellee’s Br., at *16–17.
19
Id. at *17–23.
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insurance companies and, therefore, § 27-5-114(2)(c) allows arbitration.
Wesco labels MMIA a “de facto insurance company,” citing MMIA’s
issuance of coverage opinions, its insurance of members against
enumerated risks, and its actions in the underlying lawsuit, which Wesco
argues establish MMIA as the functional equivalent of an insurance
company.
D. Amicus Curiae Reinsurance Association of America in support of
Appellees.
Amicus Reinsurance Association of America (RAA) notes that §
27-5-114(2)(c) allows arbitration agreements between insurance entities
as enforceable. The thrust of RAA’s argument is that reinsurance
agreements necessarily exist between insurers, and therefore fall under the
specific exception found within the statute. RAA defines reinsurance as
“insurance for insurance companies,” and argues that arbitration is
incredibly important to the reinsurance industry.20 Further, RAA echoes
Wesco’s contention that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not reverse
preempt the Federal Arbitration Act in this case as § 27-5-114(2)(c) does
not regulate the business of insurance.21
V. SUMMARY
Initially, MMIA’s argument appears solid. Invalidating arbitration
provisions in insurance policies clearly acts as a regulation on the business
of insurance and, therefore, likely triggers reverse preemption under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Scratch the surface, however, and the argument
begins to ring hollow. MMIA’s conclusion that the arbitration provision
in the Certificate at issue is invalidated under § 27-5-114(2)(c) relies on a
series of assumptions. First, the statute expressly allows arbitration
provisions in “contracts between insurance companies.”22 Is MMIA,
which provides pooled risk coverage to its member organizations, not an
insurance company itself? Second, the public policy behind the statute is
likely aimed at protecting unsophisticated policy holders from compelled
arbitration with sophisticated insurance companies, meaning MMIA is
likely outside the scope of the class the Legislature intended to protect.
On a positive note for policy holders, the arguments seemed to
support the conclusion that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does preempt the
Federal Arbitration Act where § 27-5-114(2)(c) is concerned, even if it
doesn’t prevent arbitration in this case. Further, the State Auditor

20

Amicus Brief of Reinsurance Association of America, MMIA v. Bozeman, at *6 (Dec. 9, 2015) (No.
DA 15-0399).
21
Id. at *16–20.
22
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–5–114(2)(c).
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presented a very clear argument as to why the Montana Insurance Code is
not the sole method of regulating insurance in Montana.

